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Abstract
This article examines the determinants of forest cover and land use efficiency in a 
shifting cultivation system.  A conceptual model demonstrates that liquidity constraints 
encourage farmers to allocate more land to forest fallow and less to cultivation by 
limiting input purchases.  Data from farm households in the Eastern Brazilian Amazon 
allow me to test whether farmers allocate land between cropping and fallow efficiently
from an individual or a community perspective.  I find that many farmers devote more 
land to fallow than is privately optimal, benefiting community income as a whole due to 
positive local externalities provided by secondary forest.  I also estimate the effect of a 
variety of socioeconomic and agroecological factors on fallow allocation and land use 
efficiency.  I find over-fallowing to be negatively associated with commercial credit use, 
suggesting that liquidity constraints do hinder agricultural intensification.  3
Do Liquidity Constraints Help Preserve Tropical Forests?
Evidence from the Eastern Amazon
With growing public interest in reducing deforestation and forest degradation to stem 
climate change and biodiversity loss, the land use decisions among farmers living at the 
forest margins are of considerable policy interest.  Much evidence has mounted about the 
drivers of land clearing in virgin forests; empirical studies from across the tropics have 
revealed factors such as proximity to markets and transportation, high agricultural 
commodity prices, and beneficial agroecological characteristics to encourage land 
conversion to agriculture (e.g, Angelsen and Kaimowitz 1999; Cropper, Puri, and
Griffiths 2001).  Credit access has also been discussed as a potential factor spurring
deforestation, though empirical evidence on this issue is mixed (e.g., Pfaff 1999;
Deininger and Minten 2002).  Much of this literature aims to predict the location of future 
deforestation in an effort to help slow the loss of forests and the global public goods they 
provide.  However, these studies have not explicitly considered whether credit constraints 
or other market failures affect the efficiency of land use patterns from the perspective of 
local farmers and communities.  
This article examines the determinants of forest cover and the efficiency of land 
use decisions in a shifting cultivation agricultural system, a form of farming relied upon 
by approximately 300 million people worldwide. In some tropical forested areas where 
shifting cultivation is a mainstay of the economy, such as the Zona Bragantina in the 
Eastern Brazilian Amazon, farmers maintain large amounts of land under forest fallow.  
Secondary forests make up a considerable portion of once-deforested land throughout the 
Amazon—around 30%, by some estimates (Houghton et al. 2000)—underscoring the 
importance of understanding the drivers of this land use.  However, the determinants of 4
forest cover in agricultural systems have received less attention relative to natural 
ecosystems (Blackman et al. 2008).  
Forest fallow provides on-site benefits to farmers, such as soil restoration, erosion 
prevention, and weed and pest curtailment.  It also provides off-site services, supplying 
some of the same local and global public goods as mature forests, including hydrological 
regulation, carbon sequestration, and biodiversity protection.  However, ecological 
studies documenting the restorative effects of fallowing on soil quality do not consider 
the tradeoffs inherent in allocating land to fallow rather than cultivation.  While long 
fallow periods can be a cost-effective way to restore soil quality, they become more 
costly when the opportunity costs of land and labor are considered.  Land must remain 
out of cultivation for years at a time to ensure sustainability, and land clearing requires 
large investments of labor.  Indeed, a study from Pará calculated that converting fallow to 
cultivated land and replacing the lost soil nutrients entirely with chemical fertilizer would 
increase farm profits, though it did not account for positive fallow externalities (Toniolo 
and Uhl 1995).  The total returns to fallowing thus depend on the relative contributions of 
fallow and cultivated land to farm income once all costs are considered.  
This study examines potential barriers to efficient fallow management, focusing 
on liquidity constraints that may promote fallowing at the expense of intensified 
cultivation.  I use data from the Zona Bragantina, a region unique in the Amazon for its 
long history of colonization, high population density, and secondary forest-dominated 
landscape.  Economic development and land use patterns in Bragantina could provide 
insights for frontier regions now being rapidly settled throughout the Amazon. While 
Klemick (2007) showed that forest fallow provides positive local externalities in the 5
Bragantina, these ecological services provide a social, but not individual, rationale for the 
maintenance of larger fallow areas than is privately optimal.  Credit constraints and other 
market failures offer a possible explanation for the persistence of these large fallow areas.  
As has been widely documented, liquidity constraints can limit agricultural 
investments, fostering rural poverty (e.g., Zeller et al. 1997; López and Romano 2000;
Feder, Just, and Zilberman 1985).  They can also affect farmers’ natural resource 
management decisions, sometimes encouraging overexploitation of the resource base 
(Barbier and López 1998).  Farmers face pervasive barriers to credit access throughout
Latin America; a six-country survey found credit accessible to only 8-33% of farmers 
(López and Valdéz 2000). 
This article presents a conceptual model of shifting cultivation in the context of 
the optimal control literature on soil fertility and fallow management.  The model 
distinguishes between the on-site benefits and positive externalities of forest fallow.  I use 
this model to explore the implications of decentralized versus collective management and 
liquidity constraints for land use efficiency.  The model indicates that liquidity 
constraints can encourage over-allocation of land to fallow by limiting purchased inputs 
used in cultivation.  The implications of such constraints for community welfare depend 
on whether fallow is managed collectively to account for positive fallow externalities.  
Market imperfections that encourage fallowing could be welfare-improving, though 
constraints that are too tight may lead to welfare losses by hindering farmers’ expansion 
of profitable agricultural activities. 
I empirically test the predictions of the theoretical model using cross-sectional 
farm-level survey data from the Zona Bragantina.  I use the value of forest fallow 6
services and cultivated land estimated by Klemick (2007) to examine whether farmers in 
the Zona Bragantina are allocating land between cultivation and fallow efficiently from 
both the individual and community perspectives.  Because fallow provides local positive 
externalities, optimal land management from the private perspective could lead to 
excessive forest clearing at the community level. 
I then jointly estimate a system of two equations to examine the determinants of 
(1) the amount of land allocated to fallow and (2) whether this land allocation is optimal 
from the farmer’s perspective. I consider various socioeconomic and agroecological 
factors affecting land use decisions, using the results of previous studies on tropical 
deforestation to inform the analysis.  In particular, I consider the effects of commercial 
credit and off-farm employment to test the hypothesis that liquidity constraints are 
associated with inefficient fallow management.  
In the next section I present the conceptual model of shifting cultivation. In the 
following section, I discuss the study area, data, and estimates of the value of cultivated 
and fallow land.  I then test whether farmers in the sample allocate land efficiently from 
either a private or social perspective.  I estimate a system of equations to determine what 
factors affect fallow land allocation and management efficiency in the next section. In 
the conclusion, I discuss the implications for tropical forest policy.  
Conceptual Model of Shifting Cultivation with Fallow Externalities
Managing land quality through shifting cultivation entails allocating land between fallow 
and cultivation to balance current and future productivity.  Models of shifting cultivation 
(e.g., Larson and Bromely 1990; Barrett 1991; Krautkraemer 1994) specify land quality 
as a function of fallow length or area.  López (1993, 1997) considers the fallow biomass 7
stock to be a village-level common property resource that contributes to productivity by 
providing environmental services.  In the absence of community-level management, 
individual households undervalue the shadow cost of lost biomass and allocate too much 
land to cultivation, decreasing income for the village as a whole.  
Here I examine the inefficiencies that can arise in fallow management even under 
private land ownership when externalities associated with forest clearing still create the 
scope for inefficient management.
1  Farm-level fallow biomass (θ(t)) equals the land area 
left fallow ( ) (t x X i i  ) multiplied by the average biomass density (η(t)).
  ) ( ) ( ) ( t x X t t i i i i   
I use the biomass density growth function proposed by López (1993) to reflect the 
relationship between fallow and cultivation: a greater fraction of land under cultivation 
entails shorter fallow periods on average and hence less biomass accumulation because 
land is regularly rotated between cropping and fallow.  Average biomass density on 
fallow land is thus assumed to decline with the biomass extracted during land clearing 











While López treats the village-level stock of fallow biomass as one factor of 
production, I allow fallow to boost productivity through two separate effects—average 
on-farm biomass and local or village-level biomass.  These two effects capture the private 
soil-enhancing benefits and positive hydrological or other externalities of forest fallow.  I 
                                                
1 Empirical studies have shown that off-farm forest cover is an important input to agricultural productivity 
in the Zona Bragantina (Klemick 2007) and in other tropical farming systems (Lopez 1993, 1997; 
Pattanayak and Kramer 2001; Pattanayak and Butry 2005).8
also assume private land ownership so that fallow biomass is not a common property 
resource, but rather a private resource supplying externalities.  
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where x(t) is cultivated area and lc(t) is cultivation labor.  I introduce a choice variable to 
represent purchased inputs, such as chemical fertilizer (z(t)).  The production function is 
increasing and concave in all inputs.  I assume all factors to be gross complements.  N is 
the total number of farms in the sub-watershed, while Ni represents the number of farms 
that provide ecological services to farm i.  
On-farm fallow biomass has an additional productive use as a source of forest 
products that can be harvested for consumption or sale.  Forest product harvests are a 
function of harvesting labor and fallow biomass, as well as off-farm fallow if 












I assume that the fallow product harvesting function is increasing and concave in labor 
and on- and off-farm biomass, and that these factors are all gross complements.
2  
Cultivated land area and biomass density also increase the cost of land clearing, as 
in Dvorak’s (1992) model of shifting cultivation.  To ensure concavity of the objective 
function, I assume clearing costs (c) to be linear in land area and biomass density.  
                                                
2 Unlike crop production, I assume that no purchased inputs are used in forest product collection.  This 
assumption is borne out in the current conditions of the Zona Bragantina but could easily be relaxed. 9
Each farm’s profits encompass the revenue from crops and forest products, minus 
the costs of land clearing, labor, and purchased inputs.  The price of fallow products is 
given by q, and p, v, w, and r represent output and input prices, the wage rate, and the 
discount rate, respectively. Suppressing the time argument, the farm profit function is  
i ci hi i i j
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If households have access to well-functioning markets, farm production is 
recursive and independent of household characteristics.  However, even when access to 
markets is imperfect, household production behavior can be represented by profit 
maximization rather than utility maximization under the assumption of fixed leisure.  
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Now I turn to the conditions characterizing farmer choices under different 
institutional arrangements.  I consider three cases: centralized fallow management, 
decentralized fallow management, and decentralized management under liquidity 
constraints.  I focus on liquidity constraints because access to purchased inputs has 
important implications for fallow maintenance.  
Case 1: Centralized Fallow Management
Under centralized fallow management, the optimal input levels are determined by
maximizing the sum of farm profits over the entire sub-watershed.  The Hamiltonian and 
necessary conditions (assuming an interior solution) for this problem are10
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The first condition (equation (2)) states that the marginal benefit of land under 
cultivation should equal the marginal costs in terms of land clearing, foregone net 
revenue of forest products, foregone positive externalities to other farms, and the shadow 
value of the lost fallow biomass density.  Labor is allocated to equate the marginal 
benefits of harvesting forest products and cropping with the wage rate, from equations (3) 
and (4).  Purchased inputs are similarly chosen to equalize the marginal value of 
increased productivity and the price (equation (5)).  The shadow value of the biomass 
density stock evolves with the discount rate minus the marginal contribution of biomass 
density to farm profits (equation (6)). 
In the long run equilibrium, at which η and μ reach steady state levels, biomass 
























X b  . Table 1 shows the steady state comparative 
statics to infer how the price parameters affect the level of fallow maintained by farmers.
3  
Unsurprisingly, forest product prices increase fallow biomass and reduce
cultivated land.  Increases in the wage rate affect land allocation ambiguously.  If the 
marginal productivity of land used in forest product harvesting exceeds that used in 
cultivation, a wage increase draws labor out of farm production, dampening the pressure 
to expand cultivation and exploit biomass.  The reverse may be true if labor has a higher 
marginal productivity in crop production.  This result depends on the existence of perfect 
labor markets, an assumption I relax below.
Increases in the crop output and input prices also have unclear effects on fallow 
management without further knowledge about the production functions.  Assuming
Cobb-Douglas technology for both crops and forest products, higher crop output prices 
cause an expansion in cultivated area and a contraction of fallow.  Similarly, increases in 
purchased input prices cause a contraction in the cultivated area and an expansion of 
fallow because the marginal cost of forest product harvesting remains the same, while 
that of cultivation rises.  Even without the Cobb-Douglas assumption, this result still 
holds if purchased inputs complement cultivated land more strongly than fallow.      
Case 2: Decentralized Fallow Management 
In the absence of any central coordination, farmers have no incentive to weigh foregone 
externalities as a cost when allocating land.  The necessary conditions for profit 
maximizing land allocation and biomass density when farmers fail to internalize the 
biomass externality are now given by  
                                                
3 Derivations of the comparative statics results are available from the author. 12
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These conditions correspond to the Nash equilibrium solution for the choice of 
cultivated land and fallow density.  The marginal value of the externality is not weighed 
in the land allocation decision or in the evolution of the biomass shadow value, so
farmers prefer to expand the area under cultivation.  Aggregate community welfare under 
these conditions is necessarily lower due to underprovision of the externality.    
Case 3: Decentralized Fallow Management with Liquidity Constraints
Now I consider a situation in which farmers do not coordinate fallow management 
but are constrained in their inputs purchases by a limited cash budget comprised of credit 
and off-farm wage income.  I introduce a labor market restriction to capture the limited 
off-farm employment opportunities typical of rural developing country settings.  Wage 
labor is positive when family members work off-farm, but it cannot exceed the 
employment constraint M.  Negative wage labor implies that labor is hired in for 
agricultural activities, as may be the case during peak periods.  I use the equality 
M l l L c h    , where L represents the household’s labor endowment and substitute out 
lh.  The Lagrangian for this problem is
(9)
(10)13
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The liquidity constraint for input purchases is given by vz wM R   , where R 
represents access to credit, wM is cash income from off-farm employment (or 
expenditures for hired labor if M is negative), and λ is the shadow value of loosening this 
constraint.  If the constraint is binding, purchased inputs are underused relative to the 






Still assuming Cobb-Douglas technology, table 2 presents comparative statics for 
the effects of the off-farm wage rate, employment constraint, and credit constraint.  The 
effect of the off-farm employment constraint is ambiguous because it is not clear whether 
decreases in fallow or cropped area productivity dominate when less farm labor is 
supplied.  The off-farm wage rate leads to increased input use and cultivated area and 








affects production only through the liquidity constraint.  Unsurprisingly, increased credit 
also causes farmers to expand crop production at the expense of fallow area.  
These results provide the basis for considering liquidity constraints a second best 
policy to minimize inefficiencies caused by decentralized fallow management.  I further 
examine the implications of credit access by deriving its effect on aggregate welfare.  
Differentiating the Lagrangian representing social welfare, which is simply the sum of 
profits over all farms in the sub-watershed, and using the envelope theorem to drop those 
terms equal to zero according to the necessary conditions for individual profit 
maximization yields the following expression
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This expression illustrates the ambiguous effect of improved credit access for 
community-level income.  The first two terms are negative and represent the marginal 
value of the lost externality caused by a slackening of the constraint.  The final term is 
positive and denotes the marginal value of increased input use due to improved credit 
access.  As the constraint slackens, the marginal value of additional inputs approaches 
zero, while the marginal value of the lost externality remains negative.  Although this 
expression cannot be signed definitively, I expect the first two terms to dominate when 
the constraint is relatively relaxed.  This result implies that a credit constraint, if not too 
severe, can improve welfare when fallow management is decentralized.
4  
These stylized scenarios illustrate the importance of institutional conditions on the 
use of fallow even under secure property rights.  Case 3 presents a plausible, though 
                                                
4 Note that in the absence of productive local externalities to forest fallow, both centralized and 
decentralized management of fallows will be efficient, and liquidity constraints and transportation costs 
will necessarily decrease welfare.  Constrained input use or decreased marginal output value in this case 
leads to underexploitation of the fallow biomass relative to efficient use.  15
obviously simplified, scenario to explain the persistence of fallow under conditions like 
those found in the Zona Bragantina, where farmers have some access to land and labor 
markets but may underexploit fallow relative to the privately optimal level due to 
liquidity constraints limiting the use of soil-enhancing inputs.  
Study Region and Data 
The Zona Bragantina offers a compelling case study as a region with over one hundred 
years of agricultural settlement where shifting cultivation persists as the principal means 
of livelihood.  Despite integration into regional markets through railways and roads, 
perennial cash-crop agro-processing, and government programs to encourage agricultural 
intensification, shifting cultivation dominates other land-use practices in the region, and 
liquidity constraints are pervasive.  
Data for the study were collected as part of the SHIFT (Studies on Human Impact 
on Forests and Floodplains in the Tropics) project, an initiative to study tropical 
livelihoods and ecosystem dynamics in Brazil.  Three municipios out of the 14 that 
comprise the Zona Bragantina were chosen for study to capture regional variation in 
distance to commercial centers, agricultural intensification, and rainfall (Mendoza 2004).  
In late 2002, 271 households in 22 villages were randomly selected and surveyed.  Tables
3 and 4 present the mean values for selected household and community characteristics.  
Most of the sampled households are considered smallholders by Brazilian standards, with 
median landholdings of 25 hectares.
5  While family labor and manual land clearing and 
cultivation predominate, hired labor and mechanized equipment can also be used for 
labor-intensive tasks like land preparation, weeding, and harvesting.  A typical one to two 
                                                
5 Ninety-four percent of the farmers’ landholdings are 100 hectares or less, the common definition for 
smallholders in Brazil.16
year cropping sequence includes maize, upland rice, and cowpea, with cassava grown as 
the final crop while fallow vegetation reestablishes (Holscher et al.1997).  These annual 
crops are used for home consumption and sale to regional markets.  Since the mid 
twentieth century, smallholders have also branched into perennials like black pepper, 
passion fruit, oranges, and coconut, as well as cattle production.  
Sampled households were poor even for Pará, earning B$1625 per capita 
annually, compared to the state average of B$3804 (Verner 2004).  Close to two-thirds of 
income was earned from farm activities, while 37% came from off-farm sources.  Old-
age pensions comprised the bulk of off-farm earnings.  Annual crops, produced by 90% 
of the farmers, dominated farm activities and contributed 54% to farm income on 
average.  Perennial crops were produced by 46% of households and made up 24% of 
farm income.  The other major source of farm earnings was non-timber forest product 
harvests (14%).
6 Most farms were semi-commercialized, retaining some produce for 
home consumption and selling the remainder in regional markets.  Sixty-two percent of 
farms used electricity, and only 13 out of the 22 communities had access to a telephone, 
indicating a lack of access to infrastructure by some households.   
Farmers in the Brazilian Amazon can access commercial credit through the FNO
(Fundo Constitucional de Financiamento do Norte), a program making low-interest loans 
to smallholders since the late 1980s.  However, despite the FNO’s mandate to target 
small farmers, complicated bureaucracy and other transaction costs often render the loans 
inaccessible (Andrae and Pingel 2001).  Even access to FNO credit might not alleviate 
liquidity constraints entirely, since loans are rationed to $B5000 per farmer (Borner 
                                                
6 Ranching and animal products (dairy and eggs) made up the remainder of agricultural activities, 
comprising 8% of farm income.  Ranching is less common in the Zona Bragantina than cropping and forest 
product harvesting.  Pasture is found on only 28% of sampled farms, comprising 5% of land on average.  17
2005).  Only 30% of sampled farmers obtained any credit from a bank during the 
previous decade, 61% of whom used the FNO program.  In addition, 24% of farmers 
using credit obtained loans through PRONAF (National Program for the Strengthening of 
Smallholder Agriculture), a late-1990s government initiative to fund agro-industrial 
projects. Of farmers who used commercial credit, 67% reported having difficulties with 
repayment.  The meager use of credit cannot be attributed to land tenure insecurity, as 
prevails in much of the Amazon; 65% of sampled farmers held legal title to their land.
Farmers in the Zona Bragantina allocate a large portion of their land to fallow.  
Virtually all virgin forest in the region has been cleared for several decades, but 
secondary vegetation covers approximately 75% of total land area (Kato et al. 1999).  
Surveyed farmers allocated over 50% of their land to fallow on average, though it is 
worth noting that 14% did not devote any land to fallow; land in the region can be 
continuous cultivated with intensive use of chemical inputs.   
Klemick (2007) estimated the contributions of cultivated land and on-farm and 
upstream forest fallow to crop production and non-timber forest product harvests, 
reproduced in Table 5.
7  The elasticities of on-farm and upstream fallow account for their
respective contributions to both crop and forest product income and vary by farm with the 
share of income from each activity, while the elasticity of cultivated area only reflects its 
contribution to crop revenues and is constant across farmers.  The positive and significant 
mean fallow elasticities underscore their importance in providing both consumable 
                                                
7 Klemick (2007) estimated four specifications for the crop and non-timber harvest production functions.  
They varied in the data used to define the upstream fallow variable (survey-reported fallow area vs. GIS 
forest cover data) and the use of instrumental variables to control for potential endogeneity of the on-farm 
and upstream fallow variables. All four specifications provided qualitatively similar results.  Here I report 
the parameter estimates from Model 1, which I use for the analysis discussed in this article. Model 1 used 
survey data to define the upstream fallow variable and did not estimate an instrumental variable model.    18
products and ecological support services in the Zona Bragantina.  The significance of the 
upstream fallow elasticity indicates that secondary forest provides important hydrological 
spillovers to downstream farmers in the Zona Bragantina.  
Unsurprisingly, cultivated land also makes an important contribution to farm 
income.  Indeed the elasticity of cultivated land is considerably higher than the elasticity 
of on-farm fallow.  Given the direct tradeoff between land used for cultivation and 
fallow, there may be gains to farmers from reallocating land between fallow and 
cropping—an issue I examine in the following section.  Of course, any such gains would 
be individual to the farm, to the detriment of downstream farmers who benefit from forest 
hydrological services upstream.  
Do Farmers Allocate Land Efficiently? An Empirical Test
The conceptual model provides the basis for empirically testing whether farms allocate 
land efficiently between cultivation and fallow.  I construct two measures of land 
allocation between cultivation and fallow similar to López (1997).  The first, which I 
term the private income elasticity of cultivated land, represents the percent change in 
individual farm income from a 1% expansion of cultivated area into fallow area.  It 
corresponds to the first order condition for efficient land allocation under decentralized 
fallow management, given by equation (11) (substituting in for the steady state values of 
μ and η given by (15) and (16)).  This term simply subtracts the marginal costs of 
cultivated area accruing to the farmer—namely, the marginal value of the lost fallow land 
and labor clearing costs
8—from the marginal benefits of increased crop production.  
Written in elasticity form, the term is given by
                                                
8 Manual slash-and-burn is more common in the region than renting expensive mechanized equipment, and 


























































The private income elasticity of cultivated land varies with the amount of land 
under cultivation (x) and fallow ( x X  ), the contributions of cropping and forest 
products to income (rcrop, rfor), total farm profits (π), and marginal land-clearing costs (c), 
factors that vary across all farms in the sample.  It also depends on the elasticities of crop 
output with respect to cultivated area (εx) and on-farm fallow (εθ), and on the elasticity of 
forest product harvests with respect to on-farm fallow (ξθ), which can be approximated by 
the parameters from the crop and forest product equations estimated in Klemick (2007).  
Finally, the rate of interest (r) is an important determinant of the optimal allocation of 
land between cultivation and fallow.  Higher interest rates justify lower levels of fallow 
biomass since the future value of fallow is discounted more heavily (López 1997).  In the 
absence of primary data on interest rates in the region, I allow the interest rate to take on 
different values representing a range of plausible conditions in the Zona Bragantina.
9  
I also create a second measure of land use efficiency that I term the social income 
elasticity of cultivated land. This measure accounts for the contribution of fallow 
externalities to neighbors’ farm profits, corresponding to the first order condition for land 
allocation under centralized fallow management (equation (2), substituting in (6) and 
(7)).  This measure can be written as
                                                                                                                                                
land under production requires approximately 3 days of labor at a cost of $B 25.  I derive marginal land 
clearing labor, which I value at the agricultural wage rate, by regressing land clearing labor on cultivated 
and fallow land (with a quadratic term for land).  These regression results are available upon request.
9 I consider interest rates of 6%, 10%, and 20% to reflect the range in subsidized credit programs and 
market interest rates faced by farmers in the region.  The FNO credit program offers subsidized credit of up 
to $B5000 to farmers at 6% interest (Borner 2005). Meanwhile, market interest rates available to farmers in 














































































This term represents the impact of a 1% increase in cultivated area on not only farm i’s 
profits, but also accounting for the value of the lost externality to all N farms 
downstream.  It includes the elasticities of crop output and forest product harvests with 
respect to upstream fallow (εΣθ, ξΣθ), also estimated in Klemick (2007).  I calculate this 
term using these estimated parameters, as well as data on land use and farm income from 
the surveyed farmers, adopting the assumptions that fallow biomass density (η) is equal 
across farms within a sub-watershed and that farm revenues and fallow area among the 
sampled farms are typical of all of farm i’s downstream neighbors.
10  I also estimate the 
variance of the private and social income elasticities using the variance-covariance 
matrices from the crop and forest product production functions.
Efficient allocation of land between cultivation and fallow from the individual 
farmer’s perspective implies that the private income elasticity of cultivated land is equal 
to zero.  If the elasticity is significantly greater than zero at the 1% level, I consider the 
farm to be over-fallowing from an individual perspective; if it is significantly less than 
zero, the farm is under-fallowing.
11  Socially efficient land allocation means that the
                                                
10 Unfortunately, I have data only on fallow area, not biomass density, so I must assume that biomass 
density is equal across all farms to calculate the social income elasticity (allowing the η terms to cancel 
out).  This assumption means that I will over(under)estimate the social income elasticity for farms with 
lower (higher) average biomass density than their downstream neighbors.  In addition, since I do not have 
comprehensive data on farm income and fallow area among all farms in the surveyed communities, I 
approximate crop and non-timber product revenues and fallow area using per-hectare averages from 
downstream farmers included in the survey. 
11 It is worth noting as a caveat that the condition for optimal land allocation assumes that farmers are risk 
neutral and that fallow has no effect on crop yield risk. However, if farmers are risk averse and fallowing is 21
social income elasticity of cultivated land is equal to zero.  If it is greater (less than) zero, 
the farm is over-(under-)fallowing with respect to community-level income.  
Tables 6 and 7 present fallow management efficiency indicators for the sample of 
farmers who allocate some land to fallow.
12  Table 6 reports the private income elasticity
of cultivated land (sample median) and binary indicators for over-, under-, and optimal 
fallowing across a range of interest rates.  I find that 41-60% of farmers are fallowing 
optimally from an individual perspective, depending on the interest rate.  Perhaps 
surprisingly, close to an equal number of farmers allocate too much land to fallow for 
individual profit maximization (40-59%).  Indeed, the median farm could significantly 
increase farm profits by reallocating land—by around 0.33% for every 1% expansion of 
cultivation into fallow area.  This elasticity corresponds to a gain in income of $B 212.79 
from shifting one hectare of fallow into cultivation. Only one farmer in the sample
devotes too little land to fallow from an individual perspective.  Unsurprisingly, the 
appearance of over-fallowing increases if farms face a higher interest rate.  
Turning to the social income elasticity of cultivated land in table 7, I cannot reject 
the hypothesis of optimal land allocation for the vast majority of farms (86-87%).  Few 
farms (2-5%) over-fallow once beneficial externalities are accounted for. Perhaps more 
surprising is that few farmers under-fallow either—only 9-13%, depending on the interest 
rate.  While community income would decrease if the median farmer converted land from 
fallow to cultivation, this effect is not statistically significant.  Whether or not farmers 
                                                                                                                                                
a risk-mitigating input, then optimal land management may entail a greater allocation of land to fallow but 
appear as over-fallowing. 
12 Note that expressions (19) and (20) are undefined for farms that allocate no land to fallow (14% of the 
sample).  I also exclude farms with negative profits (13%) from the analysis, as the expression for fallow 
management efficiency leads to a trivial and potentially misleading result—that such farms always over-
fallow; the remaining sample includes 201 farmers.  One farm has no fallow upstream, and so the social 
income elasticity of cultivated land is not defined, reducing the sample to 200. 22
deliberately account for the beneficial spillovers experienced by their downstream 
neighbors, the end result is that a socially efficient pattern of land management 
predominates.  This pattern prevails to the detriment of some individual farmers, who 
could increase their individual incomes by expanding cultivated area.
These results contrast those of López (1993, 1997), who finds farmers in Ghana 
and Cote d’Ivoire holding fallow in common property to clear excessive amounts of 
fallow for cultivation relative to the social optimum, indicating that private property 
ownership may improve the efficiency of land management.  They also raise the question 
of whether private over-fallowing that leads to beneficial community-level land 
management can be explained by market failures such as credit market failures or other 
constraints to intensification, an issue I explore in the next section.
Econometric Model of Fallow Management
I now consider what drives land allocation decisions among sampled farmers in the Zona 
Bragantina, many of whom appear to be allocating too much land to fallow from an 
individual perspective while making land use decisions that benefit the community.  I 
jointly examine the determinants of (1) the private income elasticity of cultivated land (a 
measure of over-fallowing) and (2) the percent area allocated to fallow to investigate 
potential constraints to efficient land use.
13  While area in fallow and over-fallowing are 
certainly related, they may be prompted by different factors.  The conceptual model 
suggests that fallow allocation responds to market and agro-ecological conditions, while 
                                                
13 I originally included the social income elasticity of cultivated land in this analysis as well, but the 
explanatory variables explained very little of the variation in this measure of over-fallowing.  Since the two 
over-fallowing measures are highly correlated, I focus on the private income elasticity of cultivated land to 
draw intuition about the drivers of inefficient land management among the sampled farmers.   23
fallowing more than the optimal amount of land could be caused by liquidity market 
failures that restrict input purchases.  
Building on the literature on the causes of tropical deforestation, I consider a 
variety of socioeconomic and agroecological variables that may drive land-use decisions.  
Recent studies using satellite data have demonstrated the importance of spatial
characteristics like slope, soil quality, rainfall, and distance to roads and markets as 
determinants of land conversion.  Research focusing specifically on land allocation to 
forest fallow in the Amazon has highlighted off-farm income, distance from markets, soil 
quality, and land and labor availability (Scatena et al. 1996; Coomes et al. 2000; Perz and 
Walker 2002).  These studies offer intuition about the expected effects of a range of 
variables on land allocation and management efficiency.  
Farms could be constrained in the amount of land they can profitably cultivate if 
they lack sufficient savings, cash income from off-farm sources, or credit to purchase 
optimal quantities of inputs or make capital investments important for continuous 
cultivation.  However, recent studies from tropical forested regions have reached no firm
conclusions about the role of credit in forest and fallow management.  Municipio-level 
credit infrastructure did not significantly affect Amazonian deforestation levels when 
controlling for population and road density (Pfaff 1999).  Commercial credit use among 
households in a Pará frontier community had no impact on the share of land under fallow, 
but off-farm income and ownership of mechanized equipment were negatively associated 
with fallowing, suggesting that liquidity could affect fallow management (Perz and 
Walker 2002).  Land clearing among small-scale Brazilian farmers in Pará and Rondônia 
was associated with increased chemical input use, a finding consistent with the 24
hypothesis that credit constraints limit expansion of cultivated area (Caviglia-Harris and 
Sills 2005). Municipio-level use of subsidized credit was associated with deforestation in 
a study of Chiapas and Oaxaca, Mexico (Deininger and Minten 2002).  A review of 
several empirical studies found deforestation to be positive associated with credit 
availability but negatively correlated with off-farm income opportunities (Angelsen and 
Kaimowitz 1999).  Liquidity constraints have also been associated with suboptimal input 
use in El Salvador (López and Romano 2000).  
I use farmer-reported commercial credit use and off-farm income (separated into 
wage income from agricultural and non-agricultural activities, and non-wage income 
such as pensions, scholarships, and remittances) as three binary measures of liquidity.  
Actual credit use may be arguably endogenous, depending not only on access to credit 
but also risk preferences, shocks, and farm technology choice.  In addition, credit access 
could be vulnerable to reverse causality with land and input management if farmers 
parlay better farm management abilities into improved credit-worthiness.  However, 
including this variable serves as an indicator of the correlation between credit availability 
and land and input management even if I cannot draw firm conclusions about the 
direction of causality.  This analysis also offers a complementary perspective to studies 
examining municipio-level credit availability by examining household credit use.  Off-
farm income could also be endogenous if better management skills lead to improved off-
farm employment opportunities, again preventing strong conclusions about the direction 
of causality, but still demonstrating whether indicators of liquidity are correlated with 
fallow and input use.      25
While evidence on the role of credit and land use remains ambiguous, the effect 
of transportation infrastructure on forest cover is quite robust across many studies.  Road 
density and distance to capital cities significantly predicted deforestation in the Amazon 
(Pfaff 1999; Chomitz and Thomas 2003).  The road infrastructure-deforestation 
relationship has also been found in other tropical forested regions, including Belize, 
Mexico, and Thailand (Chomitz and Gray 1996; Nelson and Hellerstein 1997; Cropper, 
Puri, and Griffiths 2001).  The relationship has only been shown to be reversed for 
Mexican shade coffee plantations, which rely on tree cover as a factor of production 
(Blackman et al. 2008).  I include village-level transportation frequency and household-
level distance to market to capture the effect of transportation infrastructure.  
Agroecological factors such as soils and slope can make fallowing more attractive 
on certain farms than others.  Studies from the Amazon (Chomitz and Thomas 2003;
Pfaff 1999) and elsewhere (Cropper, Puri, and Griffiths 2001; Chomitz and Gray 1996; 
Nelson and Hellerstein 1997; Deininger and Minten 2002) have showed that 
deforestation is more likely to occur on land with good quality soil and flatter slopes.    
Commodity prices are also potentially important determinants of land allocation.  
As indicated by the conceptual model, higher forest product prices and fertilizer prices 
encourage fallowing, while higher crop prices spur more cultivation. Community-level 
characteristics of relevance for land use might include land size, population, and 
infrastructure.  Population density has been shown to be an important deforestation 
determinant in several studies (e.g., Cropper and Griffiths 1994; Deininger and Minten 
2002), though in the Amazon the effect is more pronounced in less populous municipios 
(Pfaff 1999).  I include telephone access an indicator of infrastructural development.  26
Other potential determinants of fallow management include education and 
extension assistance.  I use the household head’s years of schooling and use of extension
as indicators of farm management ability and access to information about agricultural 
technology.  Farm ownership could also be an indicator of liquidity and land tenure 
security, which has been found to be associated with deforestation (Angelsen and 
Kaimowitz 1999). I include farm landholdings and household size to examine whether 
land or family labor constraints affect land allocation decisions.  Municipality dummies 
are also included in the regressions. 
Econometric Issues
The private income elasticity of cultivated land is measured with error because of its 
construction using estimated parameters from the econometric analyses in Klemick 
(2007).  Measurement error in the dependent variable is subsumed by the error term of 
the equation (Greene 2000), so as long as the explanatory variables are unrelated to the 
measurement error of the constructed over-fallowing variable, regression estimates are
consistent despite the measurement error problem.  
The private income elasticity of land is undefined for farms that allocate no land 
to fallow, so I must exclude 14% of farms from the analysis.  To account for potential 
selection bias, since farms that use continuous cultivation likely use a different 
production system than those reliant on fallowing, I estimate a first-stage probit equation 
for the farm’s decision to allocate any land to fallow.  I construct the inverse Mills ratio 
using the parameters from the probit estimation to include in the percent fallow area and 
over-fallowing equations as test for selection bias, per Heckman (1979).
14  
                                                
14 The conceptual model provides little guidance as to valid exclusion restrictions that affect the decision of 
whether to fallow but not the amount of land or extent of over-fallowing.  I include dummy variables 27
Because the private income elasticity of cultivated land was constructed from 
parameters estimated from equations involving variables that could be important 
determinants of fallow management—in particular, prices, slope, farmer education, and 
extension assistance—these variables must be excluded from the elasticity equation due 
to endogeneity concerns.
15  These variables can, however, be included as right hand side 
variables in the percent fallow area equation.
Spatial autocorrelation in the error terms of the equations due to unobserved 
factors important in fallow management that vary across space could lead to inefficient 
parameter estimates.  Diagnostic tests indicate that spatial autocorrelation is not important 
in the over-fallowing and percent area under fallow equations,
16 so I do not account for 
spatial autocorrelation in the reported regression results.  I do increase the efficiency of 
the parameter estimates by jointly estimating the two equations with a seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) model.
Results
The probit estimates for the determinants of allocating some land to fallow give some 
initial intuition as to the characteristics important for land management among the 
sampled farmers (table 8). Farmers who own their land, have larger landholdings, and 
have poor quality soil are more likely to devote land to fallow, suggesting that greater
access to land allows farmers to use fallow rather than relying on chemical inputs to 
                                                                                                                                                
indicating production of perennial crops and three soil types—poor (arisca), black clay (massape), and 
charcoal-enriched (preta)—in the fallow selection equation but not the two continuous equations.  Theses 
variables are not significant in explaining the percent area in fallow or over-fallowing (p = 0.74).
15 If these variables are included in the private income elasticity of cultivated land equation, they are not 
jointly significant (p = 0.54), and the coefficient estimates of the remaining variables do not change. 
16 A Lagrange multiplier test indicates that the error term of the over-fallowing equation is not significantly 
spatially autocorrelated (p = 0.53), and while the percent area in fallow equation error is spatially 
autocorrelated (p = 0.03), the spatial autocorrelation coefficient in a spatial regression estimation of percent 
area under fallow is not significantly different from zero.  In addition, a Lagrange multiplier tests rejects the 
hypothesis of spatial lags in the two dependent variables (p = 0.68, 0.29).  28
improve soil fertility.  Those who grow perennial crops and have telephone access in the 
community are more likely to practice continuous cultivation that requires no fallowing.  
Table 9 gives the SUR estimation results for the private income elasticity of 
cultivated land and the percent area under fallow.  The error terms of the two equations 
are positively and significantly correlated, indicating a gain in efficiency from estimating 
the system jointly.  Selection bias does not appear significant in either equation as 
indicated by the coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio from the probit model of fallowing.   
Of particular interest are the effects of the liquidity indicators on fallowing.  
Commercial credit use is negatively and significantly correlated with over-fallowing.  It 
also has a negative but not significant effect on percent area under fallow, suggesting that
lack of access to credit encourages fallowing, but the effect is more pronounced for those 
farmers who stand to gain the most from expanding cultivation.  Farmers without off-
farm wage and non-wage income are also more likely to over-fallow, though neither 
effect is statistically significant.  However, non-wage income has a positive and 
significant effect on area under fallow.  Since most non-wage income among sampled 
farmers comes from pensions, this finding could indicate that farmers of retirement age 
work their land less intensively, though the household head’s age, which was included in 
a previous specification of the equation, had no effect on fallow management.    
These results suggest that credit constraints may play a role in restricting farmers’ 
opportunities for expanding cultivated land at the expense of fallow, whether through 
purchasing sufficient inputs, investing in capital or infrastructure, or other channels.  Off-
farm income constraints appear to be less important in land management decisions.  29
Transportation indicators have no significant effect on the private income
elasticity of cultivated land but do appear to be important in explaining area under fallow.  
Village-level transportation frequency is negatively and significantly associated with 
fallow area, and the household’s distance from local markets has a positive (though not 
significant) effect.  These findings echo those from other studies showing a strong link 
between market access and deforestation, even in a long-settled region like the Zona 
Bragantina, where proximity to regional markets is relatively high.  However, the results
do not apply to the private income elasticity of land; lack of access to markets does not
appear to drive farmers to under-allocate land to cultivation.     
Farm size is also an important determinant of over-fallowing, suggesting that 
some farms hold excess land that they could productively cultivate but do not, though 
farm size does not affect the total allocation of land to fallow.  Other household 
characteristics—farm ownership, the household head’s education level, and use of 
extension services—have no discernable impact on fallow management.  Forest product 
prices encourage greater allocation of land to fallow, as predicted by the conceptual 
model, though crop output and fertilizer prices have no noticeable effect.  Slope also 
seems to be unimportant in determining the share of land under fallow, in contrast to 
other empirical studies of the Amazon (though the sign is negative as expected), possibly
because there is little steeply sloped land in the Zona Bragantina.   
Community-level characteristics also appear important in explaining fallow 
management decision.  Farms located in more densely populated communities, as 
indicated by a negative and significant coefficient on physical size and a positive 
coefficient on the number of families, tend to over-fallow more, while the opposite holds 30
true for percent area under fallow.  The latter result is consistent with previous empirical 
work in the Amazon, showing deforestation to be correlated with population density.  It is 
possible that the former result arises if farmers are aware of beneficial hydrological 
externalities from fallow and more densely settled communities are more effective at 
encouraging socially efficient land use.  Farms in communities without phone access are 
also more likely to over-fallow, possibly indicating that there are infrastructural barriers 
to agricultural intensification in these areas.
Conclusions & Implications for Tropical Forest Policy
The empirical findings are consistent with predictions from the theory that 
liquidity constraints limit overexploitation of fallow biomass resources.  Because fallow
provides positive externalities to downstream farms, these liquidity constraints could act 
as a second-best option to keep excessive land clearing in check and prevent loss of 
community income due to diminished hydrological services from forest cover.  Some 
farmers—in particularly those who do not use commercial credit—bear private costs in 
the form of reduced income from cultivation.    
The findings on the role of credit constraints in land use have important 
implications for policy-makers pursuing the objectives of poverty alleviation and forest 
conservation in the Amazon.  The existence of beneficial spillovers implies that removing 
liquidity constraints or other barriers to agricultural intensification has ambiguous 
implications for community-level income.  Most sampled farmers’ land allocation is 
already socially optimal (and, on balance, tends toward under-fallowing once positive 
externalities are considered), implying that increased use of commercial credit to expand 
cultivation under the current production system is likely to lead to income losses from 31
reduced hydrological services.  Current Brazilian government proposals to increase credit 
availability to smallholders through new subsidized programs (e.g., Proambiente) should 
be assessed in light of these findings. Nonetheless, shying from economic development 
that would bring improved access to financial services to the region is not likely to be a 
desirable strategy in meeting the dual objectives of poverty alleviation and environmental 
protection.  
The findings on liquidity constraints, coupled with the importance of local 
hydrological externalities, add to the growing evidence suggesting that direct payments to 
farmers for conserving forest or fallow on a per-hectare basis offer a more compelling
solution to raise incomes while expanding forest cover.  Such schemes have received 
considerable attention lately as a strategy to promote reduced emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation (e.g., Myers 2007, The Economist 2008).  Such 
payments could theoretically be set at a level to achieve the socially optimal allocation of 
land between cultivation and fallow.  They could also serve to alleviate liquidity 
constraints hindering optimal input use, leading to a first-best outcome for the community 
income.  While such programs will no doubt be expensive to fund, direct payments for 
forest land may be the approach with the most potential to achieve the elusive “win-win” 
scenario for tropical forest livelihoods.  32
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Table 1 Comparative Statics with Centralized Management and Complete Markets (Cobb-Douglas 
Production)
dq dp dw dv
dxi - + ? -
dθi + - ? +
Table 2 Comparative Statics with Decentralized Management and Incomplete Labor and Credit 
Markets (Cobb-Douglas Production) 
dM dw dR
dxi ? + +
dθi ? - -
Table 3 Household Characteristics (271 households)
Mean Standard deviation
Farm size (ha) 40.73  (47.97)        
Percent area under fallow  54% (31%)
Allocate some land to fallow
1 = yes, 0 = no
0.86      (0.35)
Household size (members) 6.18  (2.78)
Own farmland (legal title)
1 = yes, 0 = no
0.65 (0.48)
Household head education (years) 3.77     (2.91)          
Use extension services 
1 = yes, 0 = no
0.24     (0.43)          
Distance from household to market 
(km)
23.68     (12.41)
Farm profits ($B
17) 4079.78 (9345.83)
Farms with wage income
1 = yes, 0 = no
0.52     (0.50)
Farms with non-wage income
1 = yes, 0 = no
0.56     (0.50)
Use of commercial credit (from bank)
1 = yes, 0 = no
0.30     (0.46)
                                                
17 US$1 = $B 2.97, 2002 average37
Table 4 Community Characteristics (22 communities)
Mean Standard deviation
Transportation frequency 
1 = 1x/week, 2 = 2x/week, 3 =
3x/week, 4 = 1x/day, 5 = >1x/day
3.86     (1.37)          
Number of families 136.28 (96.54)
Community diameter (km)  7.26 (4.98)
Phone in community
1 = yes, 0 = no
0.60 (0.49)
Table 5 Income Elasticities of Cultivated Land, On-farm Fallow, and Upstream Fallow (reproduced 
from Klemick 2007)
Mean Standard deviation
Income elasticity of cultivated land  0.41*** (0.10)
Income elasticity of on-farm fallow  0.11* (0.06)
Income elasticity of upstream fallow  0.42** (0.16)
















Over-fallow (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.40 0.49 0.59
Under-fallow (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.005 0.005 0.005
Optimal fallow (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.60 0.51 0.41
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    















Over-fallow (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.02 0.04 0.05
Under-fallow (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.13 0.12 0.09
Optimal fallow (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.86 0.85 0.87
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
                                                
18 The net elasticity of cultivated land is only defined for farms with some amount of fallow land.38
Table 8 Probit Estimates: Farm Allocates Some Land to Fallow (1 = yes, 0 = no)
Commercial credit use (binary) 0.375
[0.416]
Wage income (binary) -0.225
[0.309]
Non-wage off-farm income (binary) 0.104
[0.295]




Log farm size 0.344***
[0.126]
Log household size 0.332
[0.299]
Household head years of education  -0.03
[0.046]
Use extension services (binary) 0.66
[0.494]




Poor (arisca) soil 1.263**
[0.611]
Black clay (massape) soil 0.025
[0.705]
Charcoal enriched (preta) soil 0.795
[0.684]
Grow perennial crops -1.191***
[0.405]
Forest product price (farmer-reported) 0.087
[0.061]
Crop output price index 0.506
[0.355]
Fertilizer price index 2.356
[2.693]
Number of families in community -0.001
[0.003]
Community diameter (km) 0.047
[0.062]
Phone in community (binary) -1.664**
[0.700]
Castanhal municipality (binary) 0.282
[0.720]







Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 9 Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates: Over-fallowing and Percent Area in Fallow




Commercial credit use (binary) -0.509** -0.065
[0.252] [0.044]
Wage income (binary) -0.329 0.024
[0.209] [0.034]
Non-wage off-farm income (binary) -0.104 0.063*
[0.221] [0.035]
Distance from market (km) 0.001 0.004**
[0.009] [0.002]
Transportation frequency 0.116 -0.016
[0.092] [0.016]
Log farm size  0.411*** 0.029
[0.115] [0.018]
Log household size -0.084 -0.037
[0.231] [0.036]
Household head years of education  0.005
[0.006]
Use extension services (binary) -0.045
[0.046]




Forest product price (farmer-reported) 0.002*
[0.001]
Crop output price index 0.031
[0.035]
Fertilizer price index -0.228
[0.284]
Number of families in community 0.003 -0.001*
[0.002] [0.000]
Community diameter (km) -0.084** 7.62e5
[0.034] [0.005]
Phone in community (binary) -0.882** 0.01240
[0.391] [0.073]
Inverse mills ratio (fallow selection) -0.064 -0.072
[0.612] [0.111]
Castanhal municipality (binary) 0.737* 0.124
[0.438] [0.079]






Breusch-Pagan test of independence of residuals: chi2(1) = 6.26 (p = 0.01)
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%